

sion through the Aristotelian understanding of prime matter and the role of form connected with this. Matter which does not belong with some form is *materia prima*, pure potency. Only in virtue of form does this *materia prima* become matter in the physical sense. If the soul be the only form of the body, then the ending of this form-relationship by death implies the return of matter to a condition of pure potency. This reversion should not, of course, be thought of as occupying a distinct moment in time: we are making an assertion in ontology. In point of fact, the place occupied by the old form is at once taken over by a new one, so that physical matter remains as it was. However, since this physical matter is now actualized by a different form, it is something fundamentally different from that which existed before when the soul was the form in question. Between the living body and the corpse there lies the chasm of prime matter. Consistently maintained, therefore, the Thomistic teaching cannot preserve the self-identity of the body before and after death.

This might seem to be an advantage in the case of the question of resurrection. Yet it has anthropological and ontological consequences which are strange, to say the least. For this reason, Aquinas' new anthropology, summed up in the formula *anima unica forma corporis*, called forth stiff opposition and ecclesiastical condemnations. At the philosophical level, it denied the identity of the corpse of Jesus with him who was crucified. Incidentally, if the body derives its identity in no way from matter but entirely from the soul, which is not passed on by a man's parents, there would also be another problem here concerned with conception, with the genuineness of parenthood.²⁴ This was why Thomas himself held back from embracing the consequences of his own theory and, in the question of the resurrection, fenced it in with additional considera-

tions meant to supply for its deficiencies. Only Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c. 1275–1334) dared to accept all the consequences entailed in Aquinas' starting point, basing the identity of the risen body exclusively upon the identity of the soul. His remained a somewhat isolated voice in the mediæval period. During the nineteenth century, the thesis was taken up again by such men as Laforêt, Hettinger and Schell. In the twentieth century it was adopted by Billot, Michel, and Feuling. In its original shape, the Aristotelian concept of matter and form underlying Durandus' thesis is no longer conceivable to us: the simple re-primization of a thoroughgoing Thomism is not the way we seek. The synthesis which Thomas formulated with such brilliance in the conditions of his century must be re-created in the present, in such a way that the authentic concerns of the great doctor are preserved. Thomas does not offer a recipe which can just be copied out time and again without further ado; nevertheless, his central idea remains as a signpost for us to follow. That idea consists in the notion of the unity of body and soul, a unity founded on the creative act and implying at once the abiding ordination of the soul to matter and the derivation of the identity of the body not from matter but from the person, the soul. The physiology becomes truly "body" through the heart of the personality. Bodiliness is something other than a summation of corpuseles. At this point, then, where historical discussion points on beyond itself to a systematic treatment of the subject, let us interrupt our reflections in order to deal with two interrelated questions of systematic theology: the end of time and the "materiality" of the resurrection.

(c) *What Is "Resurrection on the Last Day"?*

It goes counter to the logic of both Scripture and tradition to locate the resurrection in the moment of the indi-

vidual's death. So much has become clear. Let us remind ourselves once more of the main reason for this. An eternity with a beginning is no eternity at all. Someone who has lived during a definite period of time, and died at a definite point in time, cannot simply move across from the condition "time" into the condition "eternity," timelessness. Nor is recourse to the mediaeval concept of *aevum*, as suggested by Lohfink, a real solution, though it helps to clarify the issue. The idea of *aevum* was developed in order to throw light on the mode of existence of angels, of pure spirits, not that of man. In death, man no more becomes an angel than he becomes a God. Remaining human as he does, concepts which express the being of an angel or of God himself do not suit him. If there is to be any progress here, we must gain a profounder grasp of anthropology, and not take refuge in ontological constructions suitable only for nonhuman modes of being. In other words, we must ask how time belongs to man precisely as man, and so whether it is possible to find here a starting point for conceiving a human mode of existence beyond that which depends on physical conditions of possibility. Pursuing this question, we will find that "temporality" pertains to man on different levels, and so in different ways.

Most valuable in such an analysis is Book X of the *Confessions* where Augustine traverses the varied landscape of his own being and comes across *memoria*, "memory." In memory, he finds past, present and future gathered into one in a peculiar way which, on the one hand, offers some idea of what God's eternity might be like, and, on the other, indicates the special manner in which man both is bound to time and transcends time. In these reflections, Augustine comes to realize that memory alone brings about that curious reality we call the "present." This it

does, compass-like, by cutting out the circumference of a circle from the continuous flux of things, and demarcating it as "today." Naturally, the present of different people differs, in dependence on the extent of that which consciousness presents as present. Yet in memory, the past is present, albeit in a diverse manner from the presence of that which we take to be "the present." It is a *praesens de praeterito*: the past, present in its quality as past. And something similar is true of the *praesens de futuro*.

What does this analysis tell us? It tells us that man, insofar as he is body, shares in physical time measured as that is in terms of the velocity of moving bodies by parameters which are themselves in motion and thus also relative. Man, however, is not only body. He is also spirit. Because these two aspects inhere inseparably in man, his belonging to the bodily world affects the manner of his spiritual activity. Nevertheless, that activity cannot be analyzed exclusively in terms of physical data. Man's participation in the world of bodies shapes the time of his conscious awareness, yet in his spiritual activities he is temporal in a different, and deeper, way than that of physical bodies. Even in the biological sphere, there is a temporality which is not mere physical temporality. The "time" of a tree, expressed in the yearly rings of its trunk, is the manifestation of its specific life cycle, and not a mere unit of rotation around the sun. In human consciousness, the various levels of time are at once assumed and transcended, rendering that consciousness temporal in a way all its own. Time is not just a physical quality ascribed to man but wholly external to him. Time characterizes man in his humanity, which itself is temporal inasmuch as it is human. Man is temporal as a traveller along the way of knowing and loving, of decaying and maturing. His specific temporality also derives from his rela-

tionality—from the fact that he becomes himself only in being with others and being towards others. Entering upon love, or indeed refusing love, binds one to another person and so to the temporality of that person, his “before” and “after.” The fabric of shared humanity is a fabric of shared temporality.

These fragmentary philosophical reflections may suffice to formulate a conclusion which is quite decisive for our question: a human being lives in time not just physically but anthropologically. Following Augustine’s lead, let us call this human time “*memoria*-time.” This *memoria*-time is shaped by man’s relation to the corporeal world, but it is not wholly tied to that world nor can it be dissolved into it. This means that, when a human being steps out of the world of *bios*, *memoria*-time separates itself from physical time, yet, though left sheerly to its own devices does not for all that become eternity. Herein lies the reason for the definitiveness of what we have done in this life, as well as for the possibility of a purification and fulfilment in a final destiny which will relate us to matter in a new way. It is a precondition for the intelligibility of the resurrection as a fresh possibility for man, indeed as a necessity to be expected for him.

But this puts us in possession of a further insight. When we die, we step beyond history. In a preliminary fashion, history is concluded—for me. But this does not mean that we lose our relation to history: the network of human relationality belongs to human nature itself. History would be deprived of its seriousness if resurrection occurred at the moment of death. If the resurrection occurs in death then, fundamentally, history is indeed in one sense at an end. Yet the continuing reality of history and thus the temporal character of life after death is of quite basic importance for the Christian concept of God as we find that

expressed in christology: in God’s care for time in the midst of time. Origen has the finest statement of this that I have been able to find:

The Lord spoke to Aaron: ‘Wine and intoxicating liquor you shall not drink, you and your sons with you, when you draw near the tent of the covenant or approach the altar’. . . . Now our Lord and Saviour is called by Paul ‘the high-priest of the blessings to come’. He himself is thus ‘Aaron’ and his ‘sons’ are the apostles. . . . Let us see how we can apply this to our Lord Jesus Christ. . . . and to his priests and sons, our apostles. We must first note that this true high-priest, *pontifex*, with his assistant priests, *sacerdotes*, before they ‘approach the altar’, do drink wine. However, when he begins to ‘approach the altar’ and enter the tent of the covenant, he abstains from wine. . . . Before he sacrificed, during the time of the earthly economy, *inter dispensationum moras*, he drank wine. But when the moment of the cross drew nigh, and he was about to ‘approach the altar’ where he would offer the sacrifice of his flesh, ‘he took’, we read, ‘the cup’, blessed it, and gave it to his disciples, saying, ‘Take this, all of you, and drink from it’. You, he says, may still drink, you who will not in a little while ‘approach the altar’. But he, as one who now does ‘approach the altar’, said, ‘Amen, I say to you, I will not drink from the fruit of this vine until I drink it with you in the Kingdom of my Father’.

If someone there is among you who draws near with purified hearing, let him understand an unspeakable mystery. What does it mean when he says, ‘I will not drink. . . .?’ My Saviour grieves even now about my sins. My Saviour cannot rejoice as long as I remain in perversion. Why cannot he do this? Because he himself is ‘an intercessor for our sins with the Father’. . . . How can he, who is an intercessor for my sins, drink the ‘wine’ of joy, when I grieve him with my sins? How can he, who ‘approaches the altar’ in order to atone for me a sinner, be joyful when the sadness of sin rises up to him ceaselessly? ‘With you’, he says, ‘I will drink in the Kingdom of my Father’. As long as we do not act in such a way that we can mount up to the Kingdom, he cannot drink alone that wine which he promised to drink with us. . . . He who ‘took our wounds upon himself’ and suffered for our sakes as a healer of souls and bodies: should he regard no longer the festering wounds? Thus it is that he waits until we should be converted, in order

that we may follow in his footsteps and he rejoice 'with us' and 'drink wine with us in the Kingdom of his Father'. . . . We are the ones who delay his joy by our negligence toward our own lives. . . .

But let us not ignore the fact that it is said not only of Aaron that 'he drank no wine', but also of his sons when they approach the sanctuary. For the apostles too have not yet received their joy: they likewise are waiting for me to participate in their joy. So it is that the saints who depart from here do not immediately receive the full reward of their merits, but wait for us, even if we delay, even if we remain sluggish. They cannot know perfect joy as long as they grieve over our transgressions and weep for our sins. Perhaps you will not believe me on this point . . . but I will bring a witness whom you cannot doubt, the 'teacher of the nations' . . . , the apostle Paul. In writing to the Hebrews, after enumerating all the holy fathers who were justified by faith, he adds, 'These, all of whom received the testimony of faith, did not attain the promise, because God had provided for something better for us, so that they should not be made perfect without us'. Do you see, then? Abraham is still waiting to attain perfection. Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets are waiting for us in order to attain the perfect blessedness together with us. This is the reason why judgment is kept a secret, being postponed until the Last Day. It is 'one body' which is waiting for justification, 'one body' which rises for judgment. 'Though there are many members, yet there is only one body. The eye cannot say to the hand, I do not need you'. Even if the eye is sound and fit for seeing, if the other members were lacking, what would the joy of the eye be?

* You will have joy when you depart from this life if you are a saint. But your joy will be complete only when no member of your body is lacking to you. For you too will wait, just as you are awaited. But if you, who are a member, do not have perfect joy as long as a member is missing, how much more must our Lord and Saviour, who is the head and origin of this body, consider it an incomplete joy if he is still lacking certain of his members? . . . Thus he does not want to receive his perfect glory without you: that means, not without his people which is 'his body' and 'his members'. . . .²⁵

One can certainly accuse this text of utilizing "mythological" expression. And equally certainly, one can argue

that it is also formed by ideas about the intermediate state which the new anthropological insights of the high Middle Ages will later correct. But these undeniable limitations do not cancel out the deep human and theological truth on which it is built. This truth consists, first and foremost, in the indestructible relation which it posits between human life and history. The incarnation of God brings this truth onto a deeper plane where it becomes the theological assertion that in the man Jesus God has bound himself permanently to human history. Of course one cannot speak with any strict appropriateness about this relationship: in a certain sense, one's language must be "mythological." Still, one can speak in such a way that a number of anthropological truths that are not myths come to light.

In trying to do just that, we find that relationship to history can be seen from either of two sides and so in two contrary ways. First, we can ask whether a human being can be said to have reached his fulfilment and destiny so long as others suffer on account of him, so long as the guilt whose source he is persists on earth and brings pain to other people. In its own way, the doctrine of karma in Hindu and Buddhist teaching systematized this fundamental human insight, though it also coarsened it.²⁶ Nevertheless, it expresses an awareness which an anthropology of relationship would be wrong to deny. The guilt which goes on because of me is a part of me. Reaching as it does deep into me, it is part of my permanent abandonment to time, whereby human beings really do continue to suffer on my account and which, therefore, still affects me. Incidentally, this enables us to grasp the inner connection between the dogmas of Mary's freedom from sin and assumption into Heaven. Mary is fully in the Father's house, since no guilt came forth from her to make people suffer, working itself out unremittingly in that "passion narrative" which tells of the sting of death in this world.

What Origen says about the waiting Christ also obliges us, however, to look at the matter from the opposite perspective. It is not only the guilt we leave behind on earth that prevents our definitive reclining at table for the eschatological banquet, in joy unalloyed. The love that overcomes guilt has the same effect. Whereas guilt is bondage to time, the freedom of love, conversely, is openness for time. The nature of love is always to be "for" someone. Love cannot, then, close itself against others or be without them so long as time, and with it suffering, is real. No one has formulated this insight more finely than Thérèse of Lisieux with her idea of heaven as the showering down of love towards all. But even in ordinary human terms we can say, How could a mother be completely and unreservedly happy so long as one of her children is suffering? And here we can point once again to Buddhism, with its idea of the Bodhisattva, who refuses to enter Nirvana so long as one human being remains in hell. By such waiting, he empties hell, accepting the salvation which is his due only when hell has become uninhabited. Behind this impressive notion of Asian religiosity, the Christian sees the true Bodhisattva, Christ, in whom Asia's dream became true. The dream is fulfilled in the God who descended from heaven into hell, because a heaven above an earth which is hell would be no heaven at all. Christology entails the real relation of God's world to history, even though that relationship takes different forms for God and for man. Nevertheless, as long as history really continues, it remains a reality, even from a vantage point beyond death, and therefore to declare that history is already cancelled and lifted up into an eternal Last Day after death is impossible. Greshake's attempt to reconcile an endlessly continuing history with the hope for Christ's return runs aground on the rocks of such insights. For him, Christ's victory need not be a true end. It can be realized in

a dynamic, unlimited succession. . . . Understood in this way, continuing history is both open—its future undetermined, fluid—and yet in God's sight it is the steady procession of a triumphal march.⁷⁷

Such a triumphal march of God would surely have something cruel about it, for it would be in despite of humanity. The God whom we come to know in Christ's cross is different. For him, history is so real that it leads him down to Sheol, so real that heaven can be really and truly heaven only when it forms the canopy of a new earth.

In principle, these insights have decided our answers to the remaining questions which can, therefore, be dealt with briefly. First, on the basis we have established, the true content of the doctrine of Purgatory becomes clear. So does the meaning of the distinction between "heaven" and the final perfecting of the world, and thus between personal judgment and the general judgment. "Purgatory" means still unresolved guilt, a suffering which continues to radiate out because of guilt. Purgatory means, then, suffering to the end what one has left behind on earth—in the certainty of being definitively accepted, yet having to bear the infinite burden of the withdrawn presence of the Beloved. "Heaven," in the period of the postponement of the definitive banquet, in the absence of final perfection, means being drawn into the fulness of divine joy, a joy which infinitely fulfils and supports and which, incapable as it is of being lost, is in its pure fulness ultimate fulfilment. This joy is also the certainty of realized justice and love, the overcoming of suffering with all its question marks, not just one's own suffering but that which persists on earth. All of this is conquered in the visible Love which is almighty and so can do away with every injustice. Prophetically, in anticipation, this Love, the God who has suffered, has become the final victor over all evil. In this sense, truly, heaven already exists. Yet on the other hand,

we have also to reckon with the openness of this fulfilled Love for history. History is still real, it really continues and its reality is suffering. Even though, in God's Love made visible, suffering has been overcome by anticipation and the outcome is already certain, such that all anxieties are borne away and all questions have their response, nevertheless, the fulness of salvation is not yet realized so long as that salvation is only certain by anticipation in God, falling short of even so much as one person who still suffers.

Given, therefore, the real interdependence of all men and all creation, it turns out that the end of history is not for any man something extrinsic, something which has ceased to concern him. The doctrine of the body of Christ simply formulates with that final consistency that christology makes possible a truth which was quite predictable on the basis of anthropology alone. Every human being exists in himself and outside himself: everyone exists simultaneously in other people. What happens in one individual has an effect upon the whole of humanity, and what happens in humanity happens in the individual. "The Body of Christ" means that all human beings are one organism, the destiny of the whole the proper destiny of each. True enough, the decisive outcome of each person's life is settled in death, at the close of their earthly activity. Thus everyone is judged and reaches his definitive destiny after death. But his final place in the whole can be determined only when the total organism is complete, when the *passio* and *actio* of history have come to their end. And so the gathering together of the whole will be an act that leaves no person unaffected. Only at that juncture can the definitive general judgment take place, judging each man in terms of the whole and giving him that just place which he can receive only in conjunction with all the rest.

(d) *The Risen Body*

We left the question of the materiality of the resurrection at the point to which Thomas Aquinas had brought it. The fundamental insight to which Thomas broke through was given a new twist by Rahner when he noted that in death the soul becomes not a cosmic but all-cosmic.²⁶ This means that its essential ordination to the material world remains, not in the mode of giving form to an organism as its entelechy, but in that of an ordering to this world as such and as a whole. It is not difficult to connect up this thought to ideas formulated by Teilhard de Chardin. For it might be said in this regard that relation to the cosmos is necessarily also relation to the temporality of the universe. The universe, matter, is as such conditioned by time. It is a process of becoming. This temporality of the universe, which knows being only in the form of becoming, has a certain direction, disclosed in the gradual construction of "biosphere" and "noosphere" from out of physical building blocks which it then proceeds to transcend. Above all, it is a progress to ever more complex unities. This is why it calls for a total complexity: a unity which will embrace all previously existing unities. From the cosmic standpoint, the appearance of each individual spirit in the world of matter is an aspect of this history in which the complex unity of matter and spirit is formed. For, significantly enough, the exigence for unity found in matter is fulfilled precisely by the nonmaterial, by spirit. Spirit is not, then, the splintering of unity into a duality. It is that qualitatively new power of unification absolutely necessary to what is disintegrated and disunited if ever it is to be one.

The "Last Day," the "end of the world," the "resurrection of the flesh," would then be figures for the completion of this process, a completion which, once again, can